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Abstract—The paper presents an assessment of the functional
mechanisms that are part of the security system for the power
grid control. The security system, its components, and the
real time processes for the control of electricity supply were
defined. In particular, SCADA protocols used in the control
system and mechanisms for transferring them between the
control center and actuators were identified. The paper also
includes presentation of a test environment that is used for
developed security mechanisms evaluation. In the last frag-
ment of the paper, the test scenarios were formulated and
the results obtained in the cyber security system were shown,
which cover security probes reaction delay, forged malicious
IEC 60870-5-104 traffic detection, DarkNet and HoneyPot in-
terception of adversary actions, and dynamic firewall rules
creation.
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1. Introduction
The Critical Infrastructure (CI) includes supply of energy,
raw materials and energy consumption, communication,
computer networks, financial services, food and water sup-
ply, healthcare system, transport, emergency medical ser-
vices. A CI ensures the continuity of public administration,
production, storage, handling and use of chemicals and ra-
dioactive substances, including pipelines of hazardous sub-
stances. CI also comprises real and cyber systems (and
devices or facilities included in these systems) necessary
for minimal operation of the economy and the state.
In many countries energy supply is controlled in real-time
from the Load Frequency Control (LFC) system [1]. The
electricity is generated on the basis of electrical devices
requests and is adjusted to their load. The power supply
realization is centralized in the so called “secondary con-
trol process”, which means that the produced power is con-
trolled via the Central Control System (CCS). Any dis-
turbance in this system can have significant impact on all
industries and citizens.
Recently, the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems have been used to control power supply
processes. In the past, such systems run over dedicated
analog lines and networks with vendor specific protocols,
hardware and software. The network for power generation
control was, and still should be, isolated from the public
networks. Control systems such as SCADA, power trans-
mission management system, centralized LFC system and
intelligent field devices, e.g. Remote Terminal Unit located
in the Control and Supervisory Substation (CSS) and In-
telligent Electronic Devices (IED) create new concerns for
the cyber security.
Today open transmission protocols are broadly used and
computers with commercial operating systems work as
IED. It significantly improves automation efficiency and de-
creases costs, but certainly it also increases system vulnera-
bilities and decreases the security level. Nowadays SCADA
control commands and responses flow across IP networks
and over IP protocol stack. Control processes run in real-
time and are managed by power station generators.
Cyber security in information technology is used to protect
computers and networks from intentional and unintentional
events and malicious attacks. Many research and develop-
ment programs in SCADA security assessment and analysis
have been conducted, including risks analysis, vulnerabil-
ity and security assessment, penetrating testing and evalu-
ation, system simulation and emulation. Many works and
articles [2]–[7] related to this subject have been written,
but it seems that they don’t investigate the essence of the
problem. Certainly the importance of this issue and secu-
rity restrictions don’t allow publications related to it. Due
to the differences in equipment and technologies used in
the industrial control networks, the security solutions are
unique and must be adapted to the specific CI, because
of the limitations relate to the system generation environ-
ment, tools and software libraries used for its development,
as well as predispositions of design and generation teams
documented with security certificates.
The paper presents a developing process of security sys-
tem for the critical infrastructure. As a result of the design
works, solutions were developed and implemented that are
aimed at detection and reaction to cyber incidents such
as attacks from outside the system and authenticated, but
unauthorized actions from inside the power system. The
elaborated solutions and mechanisms were combined into
a cyber security and incident response system. At present,
the security system mechanisms developed by authors are
being assessed in the test environment [8]. A number of
tests and tools are prepared that are used for evaluation
of the efficiency of presented solutions. The research is
carried out in quasi-real conditions, whereby the threats
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and attacks are detected in the ICT traffic that comes from
the real control system of the national energy sector. The
power control network environment was very accurately
mapped. The research is conducted with the use of tools
elaborated for performance of attacks on SCADA control
systems that authors use in order to adjust the sensitivity
of probes and solutions. The developed system can op-
erate in both a multi-domain, dispersed environment and
in a multi-domain, centralized environment, depending of
the stakeholders’ requirements. Soon after mechanisms ad-
justment, the system will be used in a real control and
supervision station. The authors believe that the developed
cyber security system will be successfully implemented in
the national power system.
2. Related Works
Many research centers develop and adapt the security sys-
tems for the critical infrastructure in an environment map-
ping the real control mechanisms. At least several ap-
proaches to develop a SCADA system testbed were iden-
tified, varying from high-level modeling and simulation
frameworks interconnecting simulation environments, to
specialized tools recreating client-server interactions on
protocol level. These environments are prepared to test
the solutions for attacks detection and IT protection of the
critical infrastructure systems.
The need of European SCADA Security Testbed creation is
subject of [9]. SCADA LAB project [10] was an example
of such an initiative, which lasted for 2 years, and consti-
tuted coordinated efforts of many European partners. The
benefits of the project include:
• definition of security requirements for industrial con-
trol systems and a methodology for security testing,
• development of a security laboratory reflecting real
environment,
• creation of tools to facilitate efficient testing channels
and remote testbed as a service, and for effective
sharing of results and experiences,
• smart online and oﬄine dissemination of results for
beneficiaries in public and private sectors in the EU.
Research work described in [11] presents a high abstrac-
tion level method of modeling CI, as transformation from
a detailed “potential” system model to a “specific” model
reflecting a particular instance of the system.
Authors of [12] describe the Critical Infrastructure Pro-
tection and Resilience simulation (CIPRsim) modeling and
simulation framework, which has the capability for sim-
ulation and visualization of effects and interdependencies
associated with a hazard or threat event. The elements of
a simulation model communicate through High Level Ar-
chitecture (HLA) bus [13], which provides a common ar-
chitecture for distributed modeling, component-based sim-
ulation and linking to real systems. Thousands of modeled
objects took part in the simulation process, while threats
were modeled analytically in order to stress HLA bus per-
formance capabilities, rather than to assess security features
of the evaluated CI system.
Only part of the existing solutions was created with se-
curity characteristics assessment in mind, the rest being
focused on studying the interdependencies in critical in-
frastructures, information management performance and/or
reliability, etc.
3. Analysis of the Domestic Power
Distribution Control System
Efficient and proper work of complex power generation,
transmission and distribution system is required for com-
mon access to the benefits of electricity. The system is
characterized by simultaneous generation and consumption
of energy, where practically there is no energy storage. The
main task of the energy services is to constantly main-
tain appropriate settings in the system in order to generate
the right amount of power to fulfill the ever-changing con-
sumers needs, with appropriate quality parameters and in
the agreed quantities. The process of energy supply is real-
ized by power plants within less than 30 s since the moment
the demand occurs. This process is controlled in real-time
from the CCS. Generators are activated in the power plants
by the LFC mechanism in the process of frequency and
power control [1]. In CCS, the controller operates in real-
time in a loopback. Currently, the power grid consists of
114 centrally controlled energy sources [14].
In LFC, the command and response process time equals
less than 10 s (Table 1) The control is implemented using
SCADA protocols IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850, which are
encapsulated in TCP/IPv4 packets. In the case of failure,
the control is taken over by redundant systems and manual
control is possible as well.
Table 1
Processing and transmission estimated time
of control systems by LFC
Name
Estimated
time [s]
Downloading data from RTU CSS
5
on the control area exchange lines
Front-end to LFC transmission 0.8
LFC processing 2
Transmission of control LFC
2
to ICCP generator
Total 10
Generator turbines are controlled from the CCS by sending
data through an independent wide area network based on
the SDH technology (Fig. 1). Telecommunication cables
are suspended on poles along with high voltage cables.
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LFC CCS computer network is based on standard IPv4
and Ethernet with VLANs. The exchange of commands
and responses with the generators and energy consump-
tion readouts is performed in CSS. Control commands from
the CSS are directed through switches and routers to WAN
and are transferred to target routers of the power plants
generators [15].
LFC 1 LFC 2
SCADA
SCADA
SMPP 1 SMPP 2 Other systems CCS
CCS
Ethernet
Ethernet
LAN 1
LAN 2
FWFW FW
FW FW FW
ICCP
ICCP
SMPP
SMPP
WAN
Server 1 Server 2
1 ...N
...N
TCS
Power
plant 1Generator NGenerator 2Generator 1
Fig. 1. The power distribution control system architecture.
General example of the station is shown in Fig. 2. Con-
trol data are sent to the CSS station, from where they are
directed to servers, which send the commands to genera-
tors’ drivers. The connection equipment and automation
systems for the fields are controlled by the CSS as well.
The CSS is also used for supervision and monitoring of
the stations equipment and systems. At the CSS side of
the power plant, the traffic flows by separated VLANs. In
the CSS, there are field controllers which are responsible
for connection processes of electrical circuits, protection
of circuits and cooperation with power plants. Commands
from the CCS are delivered to the CSS through routers and
modems which are used to perform readouts from IEDs [2].
In addition to remote control from the CCS, it is possible to
manually control field automation systems from the CSS,
400 kV protections from Human Machine Interface (HMI)
and internal elements of the station from HMI Substation
Control. The entire CSS is physically protected using an
alarm and supervisory system. Control commands are per-
formed by SCADA systems in the CSS station. SCADA
systems are hard real-time systems because the completion
of an operation after its deadline is considered useless and
potentially can cause cascading effect and severe damage
to expensive facilities.
4. Cyber Security System Objectives
The purpose of the developed CI security system is to en-
sure secure IP communication within the power grid man-
agement. The results of the works include a security system
prototype providing:
• probing and correlating information with the use of
probes and network sensors, aimed at handling,
• automated detection and tracking of threats and ap-
propriate response measures,
• ensuring the security of ICT infrastructure of stations
and technological communication through:
– authentication,
– advanced access control, e.g. with the use of
security policies,
– monitoring and filtering of management and
control IP traffic transferring IEC protocols,
– encryption of management messages,
– monitoring of the status of the protected facility
and secure storage of information,
– honeypots and SCADA hardware emulation,
– secure communication with the central device
of Security Information and Event Management
(SIEM) and Graphic User Interface (GUI),
– documentation of management operations and
detection of potential unauthorized inside oper-
ations.
5. Security System and Testbed
Environment Overview
Electricity supply control network is an object of a too
high strategic value for direct conducting of tests related
to attacks and detection of threats because it could im-
pose a high risk for the power system. Therefore, testing
of protective mechanisms of control networks in the power
industry requires organization of environment similar to the
real one. This is way the environment for testing the cyber
security system for the power grid control was developed in
the project. Such an environment should reflect power con-
trol network elements and imitate processes implemented
therein as reliably as possible [3]–[8]. A number of re-
quirements could be formulated in relation to the testbed
for cyber security, i.e.:
• similar network resources and protocols should be
used that characterize the same vulnerabilities of the
real system. The mechanisms should enable reflec-
tion of the network structure, elements configuration,
routing mechanisms and set of the computer network
protocols used;
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Fig. 2. The CSS station structure and attack scenarios.
• the processes realized in the real system should be re-
flected as accurately as possible. Controlled SCADA
resources should be used as in the real system;
• data traffic exchanged in the testbed should corre-
spond to flows in the real network.
In order to identify, and later reflect the real system prop-
erties and solutions for its protection, it is convenient, at
the initial stage, to use the ontological model of the critical
infrastructure system. It will allow identification of impor-
tant system resources of the real environment and error pre-
vention consisting in omission of elements influencing the
entire system security. Afterwards, the system vulnerability
should be determined and, as a result, solutions increasing
the system security level should be proposed. Increased se-
curity of the control system requires identification of those
system properties that will be controlled by the protection
system [9].
The authors built a testbed consisting of one control center
CCS and several substations CSS, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
A communication subsystem is modeled in the form of
switch and router is the central node. These elements pro-
vide communication within the entire power station, sup-
porting the individual VLANs, and they create virtual net-
work in the entire network using the VRF technology [16].
The individual subsystems of the CCS station operate in the
independent VLANs, and they can communicate through
a router and CSS firewall. Elements of the CSS system
were developed using Cisco devices. The testbed includes
real IED subsystem and fields emulators as part of the
CSS, communicating using IEC 61850 and 60870-5-104
protocols. The Elkomtech devices were used for its con-
struction: communication hub (RTU) Ex-mBEL COM [17]
and Ex-mBEL field controller [18] (Fig. 3). Extortions for
IEDs (single-line-to-ground, symmetrical, short-circuit cur-
rent) and readouts (measured values) are generated using
a custom device and a station model prepared using the
LabVIEW environment. Field controllers and the commu-
nication hub communicate through an industrial Ethernet
switch using IEC-104 protocol. Display and management
of the model power system is performed using WindEx
software [19] located in the corporate network segment.
The control and management processes are performed us-
ing IEC 61850 protocol.
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Fig. 3. The power station model and the SCADA system.
SCADA network includes also the SCADA probe (Snort,
Bro) which enables monitoring of SCADA traffic. The
remaining probes of the security system allow monitoring
of i.e.:
• traffic incoming to the power station network, of
which copy is fed to one of the probes from CS
router,
• both the generation and non-generation traffic from
the enterprise network and monitoring and control
network – a copy of this traffic is fed on-line from
CS switch.
The generated IP network traffic streams are based on traf-
fic samples analysis captured at the boundary of the real
industrial power system. The gathered traffic types covered
LFC, corporate network, energy trading, measurement and
control and network management.
Traffic samples were obtained using FPGA-based hardware
probe with nanosecond accuracy and wirespeed record ca-
pability. Traffic capture includes corporate network seg-
ment traffic and control traffic data (IEC 60870-5-104).
Collected samples were regenerated [8] prior to use in
testbed generators and targeted to appropriate sinks.
Preliminary analysis of the collected traffic shows the pos-
sibility of data packets fields structure and values modifi-
cation and therefore a chance to slightly overcome proto-
cols inconveniences and limitations (required by industrial
equipment manufacturers). These proprietary modifications
can be analyzed with customized protocol analyzers, such
as Sisco open source Ethernet analyzer based on WireShark
for IEC-61850, IEC60870-6 TASE.2 [20].
In such a network (Fig. 2), which reflects the condition
of the real power management network (Fig. 1), the func-
tional tests of the developed protection mechanisms were
conducted. The researchers intend to verify the efficien-
cy of anomalies and attack detection by tools developed
by us, i.e.:
• probes based on Snort and Bro software that are
adapted for analysis of SCADA protocols in order
to detect anomalies in the power control and man-
agement systems,
• commercial IDS/IPS probes that were previously pur-
chased and are currently used in the power control
and management network,
• HoneyPots, SCADA HoneyNets and DarkNets for
monitoring and logging of all of the threats activ-
ities in ICS network,
• mediation device developed to normalize the mes-
sages obtained from the other security systems and
elements,
• SIEM system gathering, analyzing and aggregating
information received from abovementioned elements,
• databases gathering the history of power control and
management conditions,
• Cyber security Visualization and Management Sys-
tem processing data developed in SIEM in real-time,
• developed tools and open source tools designed for
verification of resilience of the power control and
management systems.
6. The Use Cases for Evaluation
of the Security System Elements
Functional tests were implemented in a quasi-real environ-
ment which is described in Section 5. The experiments
were designed to verify the system ability to detect cyber
attacks and to protect against them, as well as to adjust the
sensitivity of probes and decoys developed in the project.
For the purpose of the experiments, test scenarios were
defined, in which the probable directions and sources of
attacks were provided. In particular, the scenarios relate to
the following directions of attacks were defined:
1. from the Internet and over PSTN with the use
of unauthenticated and unauthorized measures by
hackers,
2. from the enterprise network, the attacks coming from
authorized users of this network who, due to various
reasons, attack the power control system,
3. from the control network by persons who know the
effects of the attacks and due to personal and/or ex-
ternal reasons conduct attacks on the infrastructure,
4. from the control network by users who are not aware
of the threats, authorized to resources, e.g. during
a software update, a malware is installed and trans-
ferred along with the useful applications.
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The attacks may be carried out from outside and inside the
control system. They can be performed not only by external
attackers, but also by e.g. bribed or intimidated employees,
or those unaware of the threat.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. Functional tests results of DarkNet and HoneyPot.
Let us analyze the scenario of attack from the Internet
(no. 1) with the use of PSTN or from the direction of
the enterprise network, in which the firewall protecting the
control network access was breached (no. 2, Scenario 1 in
Fig. 2). In this case, the symptoms of attack are traces
left by the control station environment recognition appli-
cations. In the scenario with the hacker poorly acquainted
with the environment, the attacker has to find out the con-
trol station structure, functions performed by the devices,
their addresses and protocols used. Two-directional traf-
fic monitoring, from and to the station, will be performed
then. Collected features of monitored traffic will be sent
toward the attacker. Such actions could be detected on the
routers in the form of increased traffic. Scanning of ad-
dresses and/or ports may be detected by SCADA decoys –
darknets (Fig. 4a) and honeypots (Fig. 4b), emulating op-
eration of station devices.
The authors present the test results that confirm detection of
unauthorized operations on the security elements (Fig. 4).
The network is scanned directly to the unused DarkNets
and HoneyPots addresses, and, as a result of referring to
honeypots in GUI of the server with SIEM, the system
service is informed on the attempt of unauthorized access
to the resources. The next scenario relates to unauthorized
operations performed from the control network (no. 3, Sce-
nario 2 in Fig. 2). Unfortunately, this access is possible,
e.g. as a result of the CSS personnel carelessness. Sup-
pose that the engineering interface serving for updating the
software is not secured and the attacker connected through
an external telecom box. It would be also possible to ac-
cess the CSS control network through a GPRS modem,
which, despite prohibitions, was installed by the control
devices manufacturer to facilitate the software update pro-
cess. A dangerous attack would be that performed by an
authenticated user authorized to operate within the CSS
but, for e.g. religious reasons, wants to cause failure of the
unfaithfuls’ power supply system. There was once a case
of an authorized employee of a large power plant suffering
from a heartbreak, who attempted to shutdown the genera-
tors. In this scenario an alert information from HoneyPot,
HoneyNet or DarkNet systems won’t probably be received.
The attacker is familiar with the station structure and prob-
ably knows that, apart from the regular devices, decoy de-
vices operate there as well. Disconnection of the station
devices would immediately result in generation of alerts in
the supervision center. Therefore, the attacker wishing to
be successful, will seek to incorrectly control the station
devices of the power plant generator and possibly forge
responses from the controlled device. In this class of at-
tacks in the security system, SCADA probes adjusted to
the device and analyzing the status history of the protected
systems will be helpful. The SCADA probe is connected in
parallel with the protected facility, but it exchanges alerts
over a path isolated from the control network to the station
security system, so its operation cannot be noticed even by
an authorized employee.
Figure 5 presents functional test of SCADA device security.
The traffic probe is connected to the IED and it analyzes
the traffic and its responses – this is the Probe learning
stage. It collects the behavior patterns of the server issuing
commands to the IED and feedback sent to the server. After
some time, the Probe enters the detection mode. The Probe
constantly reports its activity in the facility security system.
If it is switched off, the security system will generate an
alert. If the Probe detects incorrect data in the control
commands, an alert will be generated as well. The second
case is presented in Fig. 5. The incorrect control signals
are sent to the IED (c), due to which an alert occurs in the
security system (d).
(c)
(d)
Fig. 5. Functional tests results of SCADA traffic probe.
The use of malware is the last presented scenario (case
no. 4, Scenario 3 from Fig. 2), which is in fact not the
last possible scenario of attacks. Such software may en-
ter the control station along with the installed hardware or
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updated software, or as a result of infection from USB drive
or the station personnel laptop containing a virus. The older
devices and those used in the station may already contain
malware, which is waiting for the right moment to activate.
Such cases already happened in the past, an example of
which is the Stuxnet worm and its more advanced forms
from Flame or Gauss platforms.
(e)
(f)
Fig. 6. Functional tests results of DarkNet and HoneyPot.
In this scenario, detection of malware will be possible for
each of the developed cyber security measures. If the de-
vice recognizes the network environment, it will be noticed
on HoneyPot or DarkNet during scanning of addresses or
ports in the control network. The alerts will be delivered by
channels isolated from the control network to the network
protection center. In the case of control sequences sent to
SCADA (Fig. 6e) devices by malware, SCADA probe will
report anomalies, which will force appropriate action by
the station personnel. The result of malware impact will
be similar to that obtained in scenario (Fig. 6f). If the mal-
ware starts to cooperate with SCADA decoy, an alert will
be reported in SCADA DarkNet, similar to that presented in
Fig. 6. The changes in the control process will be detected
by SCADA probes present in the security system, and the
effect will be identical to that provided in the scenario.
7. Summary
The achieved readiness state of the security system allows
for its installation in the real power station environment.
The paper presents developed the supervision system of the
CSS set through the use of domain cooperation mechanisms
within one entity and inter-domain cooperation mechanisms
of different entities with the use of security policies. Due
to the limitations in the volume of the article, they could
not be included in the presented content. In addition to
the issues covered in this paper, authors have been working
on automation of security mechanisms implementation, and
they plan to not only passively, but also actively influence
certain, selected processes carried out in the control system.
In the near future, authors intend to develop the system to-
ward adaption to other critical infrastructure environments,
such as the gas industry or smart-grid.
It may be anticipated that the challenges in the smart-grid
environment associated with the security level will be even
greater.
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